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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN WASHINGTON
PHILLIP OFFENBACKER
Unauthorized practice of law is practice by one who has not been
admitted to practice by the supreme court and who is not a member
in good standing of the state bar association.' It is now undisputed that
the supreme court has sole jurisdiction over admission to practice2 and
apparently may deal with unauthorized practice as an incident of its
power over admission.' However, unauthorized practice has also been
the subject of legislative enactment.4 It follows, therefore, that the
sanctions which are imposed to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law in this state are of both judicial and legislative creation. At the
outset it may-be conceded that these acts are not inherently evil. Why
then have the court and legislature undertaken to discourage practice
by persons who are not technically qualified?
The most obvious reason for the policy of imposing civil and criminal
sanctions is to prevent the avoidance of the requirements for admission
to practice. The court and legislature have established these require-
ments and have provided that no person may practice until the require-
ments have been satisfied and the person admitted by the court.' The
I ultimate question then becomes one of the reasons for the requirements
for admission. The reason should be apparent. Artless practice by
persons who are technically unqualified is the cause of much litigation.6
In our complex society, practice of law ought not to be undertaken by
the inept, for the sake of their clients. Practice is an occupation requir-
ing professional skill, a trained judgment, and an awareness of the
overlapping qualities of rules of law. A requirement that practitioners
meet the standards of examination, character, residence, and the like,
as a condition of practicing, tends to minimize artless practice and
the harmful effects that follow it. The underlying judicial and legisla-
With this exception: non-resident attorneys may practice in Washington courts
with the court's permission, in conjunction with a resident attorney. This article deals
only with unauthorized practice by laymen, hence practice by attorneys which is un-
authorized because they are the holders of certain public offices will not be considered;
ReVised Rules for Admission to Practice 18, 34-A Wn.2d 25.
2 In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918).
8 In re McCallum, 186 Wash. 312, 57 P.2d 1259 (1936), Washington State Bar
Association v. Washington Association of Realtors, 41 Wn.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952).
4 RCW 2.48.170, .180, .190.
5 Revised Rules for Admission to Practice, 34-A Wn.2d 15; RCW 2.48.170, .180,
.190.
6 Washington State Bar Association v. Washington Association of Realtors, supra
note 3.
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tive attitude, expressed necessarily in general terms, may be stated as
follows: Persons who are not licensed to practice law are usually in-
competent to practice. Incompetent practice often causes harm to the
public. Therefore, practice by unlicensed persons may often cause harm
to the public, and should be prevented. Our court has recently an-
nounced that harm to the public, or the probability of it, is a sufficient
reason for the policy of limiting practice to persons who are technically
qualified.7 This should be the sole reason for regulating admission and
punishing or enjoining the unauthorized practitioner.
Although it is undisputed, as a general proposition, that the court is
empowered to grant some form of relief against unauthorized practice,
a difficult problem often arises regarding the classification of specific
activities. In other jurisdictions the issue is typically this: Do the acts
complained of constitute practice of law? Where an affirmative answer
is necessary the practice is enjoined or the practitioner is punished.
The term "practice of law" has often been given a wide connotation by
these courts, embracing most acts that attorneys customarily perform.
One popular definition of the term is that it ". . . embraces the prepara-
tion of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special pro-
ceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and, in addition,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and,
in general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law."8 This label approach to the problem may lead
to consistent conclusions, but the Washington court has not used the
technique, and has, more often than not, declined to define "practice
of law". The Washington court, rather, attempted to narrow the field
of acts prohibited. The facts of a few of our cases may clearly have
called for a prohibition of the activities, for example, where the practice
was before a court;9 but in the majority of the cases the court was
concerned with the policy question of whether the acts complained of
should be classified as sanctionable varieties of unauthorized practice.
The Washington court has in some cases declined to enjoin or punish
acts which probably would be dealt with in other states as unauthorized
practices, preferring not to lay down broad prohibitions but to deal
with each case as it arises. The problem has been treated as one pecu-
liar to the state, and the formulae of other states have been disregarded
to a large extent.1"
7 Ibid.
8 2 R.C.L. 938, § 4.
9 See Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933).
10 See Washington State Bar Association v. Washington Association of Realtors,
mipra note 3.
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Before considering the specific rules that have been developed in
Washington, a brief examination of the nature of practice of law should
be made. The practice of law is a service, that is, it is employment
for the principal benefit of others. For this reason a laymian does not
practice law when he he transacts the business affairs in -which he is a
principal, even though this may involve what is conceded to be legal
work. If this proposition is doubted, then such activity is still not
unauthorized practice, for it is a common law right too well established
to be disputed. Furthermore, appearance in court in one's own behalf
is permitted by statute in this state." Our investigation of unauthorized
practice is then concerned only with practices performed for the
primary benefit of other persons, the practitioner not being a party
in interest. The area may be further cut down by eliminating all merely
ministerial acts as not being within the scope of our investigation. The
practice must be professional, at least in the sense that it is the product
of an exercise of judgment. To summarize, there must be a rendition
of service, based on judgment and discretion. Without this there can
be no unauthorized practice.
Because the Washington court has not given us a modern definition
of the term "practice of law," we are without a broad statement indi-
cating the specific acts which will be prevented. Furthermore, the
court has recently asserted that the definitional or label approach will
not be used." In this attempt to ascertain the court's present position
on unauthorized practice it becomes necessary to examine the court's
attitude toward specific practices as it is revealed by case law. The
phases of practice fall conveniently into four categories.
The most obvious category consists of the management of a cause
before a court. This is clearly an instance of contempt, and the clarity
of this situation accounts for a lack of decisions squarely on the sub-
ject."
Another form of practice is the preparation of pleadings and similar
documents. The court has apparently indicated that this activity falls
within the area of prohibition, for the preparation of the legal docu-
ments required in probate proceedings,' and the preparation of com-
plaints and writs of garnishment' have been held to be unauthorized
practice.
"RCW 2.48.190.
12 See Washington State Bar Association v. Washington Association of Realtors,
.mtpra note 3.
Is But see Ferris v. Snively, supra note 9.
14 Ferris v. Snvely, supra note 9.
'5 Yount v. Zarbell, 17 Wn2d 278, 135 P2d 309 (1943).
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Giving legal advice is also prohibited.'
Thus far the course has been rather plain. Not much objection can
be raised against a policy which prohibits advocacy, counselling, and
the preparation of pleadings by laymen. The fourth category, the
preparation of ordinary business instruments, has been more trouble-
some. In this situation the reasons for regulating practice may be less
clear to laymen. The problem looms larger because the profitable use
of such tactics is much greater.
Unauthorized drafting typically occurs in this way: many business
transactions are brought about by specialists, such as real estate brokers,
bankers, accountants, and property management agents, who are not
parties to the transaction itself and, therefore, not authorized, as the
parties are, to draft the documents necessary to the transaction. The
reasons why the specialist takes it upon himself to draw the instruments
are numerous. Along with the factor of convenience may be the special-
ist's intimate contact with the transaction, his desire to give his custo-
mer a complete service, his often extensive experience in the particular
business involved, and, occasionally, the belief (sometimes well
founded) that to secure the services of an attorney means delay and
possible loss of the transaction.
Under these circumstances there are bound to be conflicting ideas
as to how the problem should be met. It is plain that drafting by lay-
men should not be completely unchecked. The problem is the extent
to which drafting by a specialist of the documents necessary to his
legitimate business activities is consonant with the needs of the parties
to be protected from unskilled drafting. The position taken by the
writer of this article is expressed in the following paragraph.
Every sale of real property negotiated by a broker or other specialist
involves two sets of legal relations. One exists between the buyer and
seller, the other, between the broker and the party who retains him,
usually the seller. The broker is a party to this latter or secondary
transaction. The interest of the broker in this transaction is the fee
or commission which is to be earned by finding a buyer. Is the broker
placed in a position in which he cannot earn his fee because he is not
authorized to draft the instruments required in the principal transac-
tion? Apparently he is not, for the fee is earned typically by finding
a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to buy. The commission is not
earned by drafting the deed or contract which defines the legal relations
of the parties to the principal transaction. Since the deed or contract
16 State ex rel. Ayano v. Washington State Bar Association, 24 Wn.2d 706, 167
P.2d 674 (1946) ; Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
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defines the legal relations of the principal parties only it cannot be
doubted that the broker who drafts such instruments engages in unau-
thorized practices, and since the broker's interest is not prejudiced if
he does not draft these documents there is no justification for such
practices. The rule which can be formulated from this example has
support in Washington case law.'7 This rule is that the preparation of-
any document having any effect upon the legal relations of the parties,
concerning a transaction to which the draftsman is not a party, amounts
to pracice of law.
In some quarters the idea is advanced that this rule is undesirable
because its strictness may foreclose to laymen many useful activities.
According to this view it should be permissible for laymen to draft
simple instruments, while documents involving complex rules or rela-
tions would be outside the layman's authority. Instruments prepared
from printed forms would apparently be considered as simple instru-
ments, on the theory that the draftsman in fact does little or no writing
other than to fill in the blanks with known information. The fallacy
of the "simple instrument" theory lies in its assumption that untrained
persons can skillfully prepare these instruments. Judge Pound remarked
on this subject: 8 "I am unable to rest any satisfactory test on the dis-
tinction between simple and complex instruments. The most complex
are simple to the skilled, and the simple often trouble the inexperi-
enced." Furthermore, this theory necessarily assumes that all instru-
ments fit into one of two well defined categories. There would be diffi-
culty in applying such a rule. In addition, with respect to the use of
printed forms, it is well known that such forms are used primarily for
the purpose of time saving and uniformity, and not because they are
less complex than documents in other forms.
An approach differing from either of the above ideas was apparently
taken by the Washington court in the case of Washington State Bar
Ass'n. v. Washington Ass'n. of Realtors."9 The court-there examined
the alleged unauthorized practices with an eye to deciding whether
the practice showed such a lack of skill that the client was placed in
an unsatisfactory position, rather than flatly stating either that the
practice was practice of law and illegal or' that the practice was simple
drafting and permissible. A resort to prior case law will serve as intro-
duction to the Realtors case.
'.7 Paul v. Stanley, supra note 16.
Is People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y 336, at page ...., 125 N.E. 666,
at page 670 (1919).
19 Supra note .3.
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The first Washington case on the subject of drafting was Paul v.
Stanley."° There the defendant, a notary public, had drafted wills,
community property agreements, warranty and quit claim deeds, con-
ditional sale contracts, creditor's claims in probate, and various other
documents, for compensation, and had also given legal advice with the
instruments. Two attorneys sought an injunction. RRS 139-4 pro-
vided that "No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney at
law or to do work of a legal nature for compensation ... unless...
(he) has been admitted to practice law in this state . . ." At the trial
the defendant asserted that he had the right to draft these instruments
and would continue to do so if not enjoined. The trial court granted
an injunction ordering the activities ceased, whether performed for
compensation or not, but permitting the defendant to continue to draft
"simple" instruments so long as he remained a notary public. Both
sides appealed, the plaintiffs because the injunction allowed the de-
fendant to draft simple instruments, and the defendant because the
injunction prohibited gratuitous drafting. The supreme court stated
that an attorney possessed a privilege to practice law, that this privi-
lege was of the nature of a property right, and that a court of equity
would protect it from infringement. The decree was then modified
in two respects. First, the court rejected the idea that a notary public
ought to be permitted to draft simple instruments, citing Judge Pound's
statement in support," and further stating: "The evil from which RCS
139-4 is designed to protect the public is not done away with by per-
mitting the respondent to draw simple instruments which either define,
set forth, limit, terminate, specify, claim or grant legal rights."2 This
holding was weakened by prefacing it with language indicating that
relief would not have been granted but for the fact that the defendant
had also given legal advice to the persons for whom the drafting was
accomplished. In other words, the fact of oral advice was apparently
made an element of unauthorized drafting. The second modification
was the result of holding that the defendant should not be enjoined
from drafting instruments gratuitously, the ground for this being that
it was not the intention of the legislature, as expressed in RCS 139-4,
to protect persons from incompetency when they had paid nothing for
the work done. It is apparent throughout the opinion that the court
20 Supra note 16. For a complete discussion see: Shattuck, Injunctive Relief against
the Unlicensed Practice of Law as Represented by Drafting of Legal Instruments, 8
WASH. L. REv. 33.
21 168 Wash. at p. 378, 12 P.2d at p. 404.
22 At page 378 of the opinion.
23 At page 376 of the opinion.
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felt that it should operate entirely within the framework of the statute,
for no mention was made of any inherent power over unauthorized
practice. To summarize, the Paul decision was that a court of equity
could enjoin a layman, at the instance of an attorney, from drafting
legal instruments whether simple or complex, when compensation was
received and when legal advice was given. The compensation require-
ment has probably been a considerable road block to the initiation of
unauthorized practice actions, for most brokers make no separate
charge for the preparation of deeds.
In re McCallum24 and In re Estes25 were original contempt proceed-
ings. McCallum, a notary public and real. estate broker, had prepared
deeds; real estate contracts and mortgages, for compensation. After
admonition by the bar association he had ceased accepting compensa-
tion for the work, and after further admonition had ceased the practice
altogether. The supreme court, after assuming that McCallum had
practiced law in the respect alleged, decided that it possessed the in-
herent power to punish as for contempt a layman who had practiced
law. The court declined to punish him in this case, however, on the
ground that his conduct did not warrant punishment by such a drastic,
summary proceeding. The Paul case was distinguished on the ground
that there the defendant had given legal advice to the persons for whom
the work was done, and had been guilty of more flagrant conduct. Dis-
missal was without prejudice to another, form of action. The Estes
case was similar in facts and was disposed of by a reference to the
McCallum opinion. The opinions are obiter dictum as to the court's
contempt jurisdiction over unauthorized drafting where there has been
'no allegation of violation of injunction, but the cases may have fore-
cast the court's later willingness to break away from the self imposed
limitations of statutory law and exercise inherent powers in dealing
with unauthorized practice.
Returning now to the Realtors case, this case was originally an action
against all licensed real estate brokers in the state, in which an injunc-
tion was sought against the preparation of deeds and other documents.
It was eventually reduced to an action against one C. K. Worrell, the
complaint alleging that he had unlawfully practiced law and had un-
lawfully done work of a legal nature. He was specifically accused of
preparing five statutory form deeds and two real estate contracts.
Worrell admitted that he had prepared four deeds from printed forms.
24 186 Wash. 312, 57 P.2d 1259 (1936).
25186 Wash. 690, 57 P2d 1262 (1936).
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The defense was that no compensation had been received for the prepa-
ration of the deeds, other than the usual broker's fees earned for finding
the buyers. The trial court ruled that the Paul case was controlling,
and denied relief because of the lack of compensation. On appeal the
case was reversed. As hinted in the Estes and McCallum opinions the
court was willing to exercise an inherent power of regulation over un-
authorized practice, and was unwilling to be limited by statute. The
following propositions were laid down:
(1) one who prepares an instrument by filling in blanks in a printed
form does work of a legal nature, for every form must be skillfully
adapted to conform to the agreement intended by the parties;
(2) the court has the inherent power to protect the public interest
by injunction when an unskilled person does work of a legal nature;
(3) statutes are no bar to the power of the court to interfere by
injunction when the statutes do not adequately protect the public in-
terest. A statute which apparently permits practice by unqualified
persons when performed gratuitously is inadequate protection, and does
not, therefore, stand in the way of court interference. The Paul case
was expressly overruled as to the compensation requirement.
The court also considered these factors, and indicated that they had
an effect on the decision: (1) One who prepares legal documents im-
plicitly represents that he is qualified to do the work; (2) A lay drafts-
man is unfettered by canon and so may always represent both the
parties to a transaction; (3) There is no simple legal instrument which
can necessarily be distinguished from a complex one so as to justify
its preparation by an unqualified person.
The injunction was then ordered granted, but on a very limited scale.
The defendant was to be enjoined only from doing the kind of legal
work that was evidenced by one of the deeds which ambiguously re-
ferred to a mortgage; this limitation because of the narrowed issues of
the case, the court's reluctance to exercise its inherent powers, and the
fact that the result was reached via the partial overruling of previous
case law. It is not clear whether the injunction was intended to prevent
merely the defective drafting of deeds referring to mortgages, or the
drafting of deeds referring to mortgages, or the defective drafting of
deeds, or all defective drafting. Concurring in the result in a separate
opinion Judge Donworth stated that an injunction should be granted
to prevent the drafting of any deeds.
The opinion definitely rejects the concept that a layman should be
permitted to draft "simple" instruments. At the same time it fails to
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embrace the theory that laymen should be prevented from preparing
any instrument affecting legal relations where he is ,not a party, this
being evidenced by the fact that the defendant was not enjoined in
toto from drafting deeds. The outstanding features of the opinion are -
the court's refusal to be limited by statutory law, and the emphasis that
is placed upon the public interest factor. The court declined to define
practice, and stated that each case was to be disposed of on its own
facts, with relief to be granted wherever a continuation of the practice
was detrimental to the public interest.
What practices are likely to be found detrimental to the public inter-
est? Does the public interest suffer when one who is technically unquali-
fied does work of a legal nature, or does it suffer only when such person
does legal work imperfectly? Does "harm to the public interest" mean
realized harm to the client, or the litigation that is created, or merely
disadvantage to the client from being placed in a weak or ambiguous
position? It is fairly clear that there is harm to the public, within the
meaning of the language of the opinion, when the client has been placed
in a weak or ambiguous position as the result of unauthorized practice,
and that there is harm to the public where there is a probability' of
unnecessary litigation because of the client's position. In addition, there
is language in the opinion which will support either of two other proposi-
tions which are contrary to one another: (1) When an unqualified per-
son practices law there is a probability of'harm to the public which
will not be condoned; and (2) To be enjoinable there must be practices
which are demonstrably imperfect. This language makes it difficult,
if not undesirable, to attempt to forecast future results, but it should
be kept in mind that one of the strong limiting factors of this case, the
partial overruling of the Paul case, would not be present in future liti-
gation. It is not unlikely that in the future the scope of relief granted
will be broader, for example, enjoining all drafting by one who has
demonstrated that he is unqualified, even though a part of his work
was properly done. The Realtors case may at least be taken as a present
warning that laymen who draft legal documents for others do so at the
peril of being involved in unauthorized practice litigation if they err.
Does the result of the Realtors case accord with the underlying policy
of protecting persons from the harmful effects of incompetency? Proba-
bly not. The defendant amply demonstrated that he was not qualified
to draft deeds, the evidence of this being the realization of harm to
the grantee. A continuation of the practice will create the probability
of harm to other grantees, and to the public through the probability of
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unnecessary litigation, even though the deeds drafted by the defendant
do not refer to mortgages. It is, therefore, submitted that laymen in
the following cases should be denied the authority to draft documents
affecting legal relations when they are not parties: (1) When the lay-
man has demonstrated a lack of ability. This is evidenced by the
realization of harm to a client. A present lack of ability indicates a
probability that the harm will occur again if the practice is continued.
(2) Where the practice is continuous or periodical. Here it is likely
that the draftsman, not being technically qualified, will eventually
cause harm to someone. In either of these two cases a failure to halt the
practice will result in an avoidance of the reason for the requirements
for admission to the bar.
What was the effect of the Realtors case upon statutory enactments?
The court stated that RCW 2.48.190 ". . might well be viewed as a
statement of the minimum requirement for an action at law for relief
against the proscribed activities. It is not a maximum requirement
that divests a court of jurisdiction or precludes its action in an equitable
proceeding."2 The kind of "action at law" referred to by the court does
not come readily to mind, suggesting that this statute may well be a
dead letter, although an argument, by the bar association that the
statute was repealed by implication by RCW 2.48.180 was noticed by
the court but left unanswered."
Passing once more into the general problem of unauthorized practice,
and leaving the specific problem of drafting, it will be of interest to
examine the circumstances under which the issue of unauthorized prac-
tice has arisen. Unauthorized practice may be the cause of the litiga-
tion, or it may arise incidentally as a defense. The nature of the pro-
ceeding may be equitable, criminal, civil, or special.
In State v. Chamberlain,' the only appellate criminal decision on the
subject, the defendant was charged with a violation of RCS 139-4.2
The language of the information charged that the defendant ". . . did
then and there willfully and unlawfully represent himself as, and prac-
tice as an attorney and counsellor at law, and did then and there do
work of a legal nature for compensation." The issue on appeal was the
sufficiency of the information. The defendant argued that the informa-
tion was vague, there being no statutory definition of the crime charged.
26 At page 699 of the opinion.
27 Cf.: OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 55-57 #1.
28 132 Wash. 520, 232 Pac. 337 (1925).
29 R.C.S. 139-22 made violation of R.C.S. 139-4 a gross misdemeanor. The provisions
of R.C.S. 139-22 have been omitted from the revised code.
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The court defined "practice of law" as doing that which an attorney
or counselor at law was authorized to do, and held that the information
was sufficient under the rules of criminal pleading since it substantially
followed the language of the statute.
In Washington State Bar Association v. Merchants Rating and Ad-
justing Company" the court held that a corporation which instituted
litigation in its own name on accounts assigned to it for that purpose
was not practicing law. The collection agency was held to be a party
in interest, under RRS 191,1 and not therefore practicing without
authority. In State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corpora-
tion,82 a quo warranto proceeding, it was shown that the defendant had
sold membership cards to merchants entitling them to extensive legal
services from named attorneys for the period of one year. The court
held that the defendant corporation was either acting as a solicitor for
attorneys or was actually practicing law through its attorney agents,
and in either event a judgment of ouster was necessary. Practice of
law by a corporation is of course always illegal.3
In Ferris v. Snively," the plaintiff, a law clerk, sued the heirs of his
deceased employer. One cause of action was for services rendered as
an employee of the deceased employer, and the other was for services
rendered to the heirs relating to the probate of the attorney's estate.
The defendants showed that the plaintiff had committed numerous acts
of unauthorized practice in performing the services alleged in both
causes of, action. Unauthorized practice was held not to be a defense
to the first cause of action, on the principle that the defendants were
representatives of the deceased employer and should not be permitted
to invoke the defense of illegality. As to the second cause of action,
the court said that in an action against a client the. defense of unau-
thorized practice was available, and that if the plaintiff wished to
recover for that portion of the services which were lawful he must
segregate them from those that were unlawful. In Yount v. Zarbel3
the plaintiff, an attorney, sued for services rendered as employee of a
collection agency. A part of the agency's business was to institute suit
on accounts assigned to it for that purpose. It was shown that the
plaintiff had rubber stamped complaints and writs of garnishment pre-
pared by the defendant employer. The acts of the employer were said
80 183 Wash. 611, 49 P.2d 26 (1935) ; discussed in 11 WAsH. L. REv. 39.
31RCW 4.08.060.
$2105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
33 Ibid.
84 Supra note 9.
35 Supra note 15.
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to be unauthorized practices so that there was a violation by the plaintiff
of Rule 10, Section 5, Rules for Discipline of Attorneys, in lending her
name to be used by one not authorized to practice law. This was a
defense. There is an apparent conflict between this case and the Mer-
chants Rating and Adjusting case on the issue of unauthorized practice,
for in both cases the collection agency was an assignee for collection
and hence a party in interest.
In State ex rel. Ayamo v. Washington State Bar Association" the
relator sought a review of the denial by the Board of Governors of
his application for admission to practice. The relator had held himself
out to others as an attorney, and had given legal advice to persons in
his office, upon the door of which was a sign "Legal Adviser". In fact
the relator was licensed to practice law in Indiana. The court held
that the relator's conduct amounted to unauthorized practice and a
representation that he was a Washington attorney. This was a sufficient
reason for denying the application for admission on the ground of
unethical conduct.
36 Supra note 16.
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